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PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY: A DOCTRINE IN
SEARCH OF JUSTIFICATION
GAIL D. HOLLISTER*
INTRODUCTIONO ver fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
stated that the parent-child immunity "should not be tolerated
at all except for very strong reasons; and it should never be extended
beyond the bounds compelled by those reasons."' Other critics of the
doctrine have gone further, arguing for the complete abolition of the
immunity and characterizing as nebulous the reasons that have been
advanced to justify it.' Yet, within the last ten years, many courts
have reaffirmed the parent-child immunity, at least in part. 3 Addi-
tionally, one court, which had abolished the immunity, has now
revitalized and in some ways expanded on it through the rubric of a
lack of duty on the part of parents.4
The parent-child tort immunity rule denies a minor child a cause of
action for personal injuries inflicted by his parents.5 The rule was
created by American courts in the late nineteenth and early tventieth
centuries, 6 but has antecedents in Roman law.7 This Article discusses
the genesis of the immunity, its current status and the social costs and
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. 1967,
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1970, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
2. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 Viii. L. Rev. 521, 529 (1960);
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030,
1079-80 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy I]; Comment, Tort Actions Between
Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. Rev. 152,
187-93 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Tort Actions]; Comment, Parent-Child Immu-
nity: The Case for Abolition, 6 San Diego L. Rev. 286, 295-96 (1969).
3. E.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 222, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980);
Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974) (en bane); Schneider
v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1979); Horton v. Unigard Ins., Co., 355 So. 2d 154,
156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560,
564 (1980); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 500-01, 316 N.E.2d 455, 457
(1974); Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Montz v.
Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 388 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1978); Triplett v. Triplett,
34 N.C. App. 212, 213-14, 237 S.E.2d 546, 547 (1977); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d
99, 101 (Wyo. 1971).
4. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 48, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 869 (1974) (parents have no legally cognizable duty to supervise their children);
see infra pt. II(C).
5. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Citing no authority, the Supreme Court of Mississippi gave birth to the
parental immunity rule in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887
(1891). The Hewlett rule was endorsed in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,
390, 391-93, 77 S.W. 664, 664-65 (1903), and in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 246-
47, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
7. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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benefits that it generates, to consider the extent to which the immu-
nity should be retained.
Part I examines the historical and social basis of parent-child immu-
nity and the justifications advanced for its existence. Part II notes the
social changes that have led to increasing criticism of the immunity
and analyzes the approaches various states have taken in partially or
totally abrogating the immunity in suits for negligently inflicted inju-
ries.8 Particular attention is devoted to the issue of parental liability
for negligent supervision because suits involving this issue most clearly
raise the conflict between a parent's right to raise his child according
to his own beliefs and methods9 and the child's need to be compen-
sated for injuries inflicted by the parent. The crucial question is
whether courts can fashion an objective standard that does not result
in second-guessing parents in the management of their family af-
fairs.10 Part III suggests two possible approaches to the problems
raised by suits between parents and their children.
I. THE CREATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
A. The Child's Position in Early Legal Systems
The legal rights and duties existing between parent and child have
varied significantly throughout history. Under the early Roman sys-
tem, the head of a family, paterfamilias, had nearly total power over
the unemancipated children in the family unit. He possessed not only
the power to alienate the child," but also control over the child's life
and death. 12  Consequently, he bore no liability for causing bodily
injury to the child. Furthermore, because the child could not own
property, any property acquired by the child automatically belonged
to the paterfamilias.1 3
It was fruitless, therefore, for a child to attempt to sue the paterfa-
milias for maltreatment, although as a general rule Roman law per-
mitted compensation for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted.14 Even
8. For a review of the current status of the parent-child immunity, see injra
Appendix.
9. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-36 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-69 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
10. See Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49
(1975) ("Each parent has unique and inimitable methods and attitudes on how
children should be supervised. Likewise, each child requires individualized guidance
depending on intuitive concerns which only a parent can understand.... Allowing
a cause of action for negligent supervision would enable others, ignorant of a case's
peculiar familial distinctions and bereft of any standards, to second-guess a parent's
management of family affairs .... ).
11. M. Kaser, Roman Private Law § 60, at 257 (R. Dannenbring trans. 2d ed.
1968).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 259.
14. Id. § 50, at 209, § 51, at 215.
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if the child could overcome the rights of the paterfamilias and win
compensatory damages, the amount recovered would have automati-
cally reverted to the paterfamilias. The legal system thus gave the
paterfamilias not only carte-blanche to determine the child's fate, but
also a de facto immunity that arose from the child's inability to own
property.
An erosion of this absolute authority of one generation over another
began during the Roman Empire.'5 Initially, the parents' power of
life and death over the child was limited only by moral constraints.'0
These were eventually supplemented by legal sanctions, including, in
rare instances of parental abuse, the imposition of the death penalty., 7
By the Middle Ages, children's social and legal positions had some-
what improved. They could own property as individuals separate
from their parents, 18 and moral and legal sanctions were developing
to protect them.' 9 Nonetheless, "parental negligence. . . , abandon-
ment, exposure and . . . infanticide [were still] . . . major threats to
young life." 20
The child's position was little better in colonial America, where he
was viewed as" 'full of the stains and pollutions of sin.' "21 Parents
were expected to treat their children sternly to rid them of vices,
particularly the sins of pride and disobedience.22 This belief in the
need for parental authority was evidenced by statutes enacted in
Massachusetts and Connecticut in the mid-seventeenth century that
provided for the death penalty if a child over sixteen should curse or
strike his father or mother or if he was stubborn or rebellious.23
Although the view of the child as evil and in need of strict discipline
had moderated somewhat by the middle of the nineteenth century,
parents were still encouraged to be strict, and severe punishment was
common.2 4 The law did provide for criminal penalties if parents, in
correcting their children, overstepped the bounds of reason.5 Rea-
15. Id. § 3, at 22, § 60, at 256-61.
16. Id. § 3, at 22, § 60, at 256-57.
17. Id. § 60, at 257; G. Payne, The Child in Human Progress 266 (1916).
18. 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 516-17 (3d ed. 1927).
19. McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents from the Ninth
to the Thirteenth Centuries, in The History of Childhood 101, 120-21 (L. deMause
ed. 1974); see G. Payne, supra note 17, at 289-90, 304-05; deMause, The Evolution
of Childhood, in The History of Childhood 1, 42 (L. deMause ed. 1974).
20. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 119; accord deMause, supra note 19, at 25-28.
21. Stone, The Rise of the Nuclear Family in Early Modern England: The
Patriarchal Stage, in The Family in History 42 (C. Rosenberg ed. 1975) (citations
omitted).
22. Id. at 42-43.
23. Id.
24. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887, 908-09 (1975).
25. See T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts § 123, at 259-60 (5th ed.
1930).
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son, however, until recently knew few bounds, and parents had to go
far before they could be held criminally responsible. 2 Before the
middle of the last century, a parent could not have been held liable
unless he had acted with malice or had inflicted permanent injury. 27
Furthermore, even when those criteria were met, he might well have
the defense of parental privilege in matters of discipline.28 The par-
ent was additionally protected by a presumption that parental correc-
tion was proper, and the burden of proof lay on the person asserting
that the parent had acted improperly. 29
Thus, although the advent of criminal punishment of severely abu-
sive parents marked a significant increase in the recognition of the
value of the child, the protection it afforded the child was somewhat
illusory. Not only were convictions difficult to obtain but, even upon a
parent's conviction, an injured child received little real protection. At
most, the offending parent was separated from the child for a period
of time, possibly leaving the family without any means of support.
When a fine, rather than a jail sentence, was imposed, the injured
child was left completely unprotected. 30
26. Few criminal prosecutions were brought against parents for mistreating their
children, but in those that were instituted, the courts recognized wide parental
discretion. For example, in 1837 in a case where parents had punched their child,
pushed her head against the wall, switched her, tied her to the bed for two hours and
hit her with cowhide, the court held that the reasonableness of the actions was a
question for the jury. Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. 282, 284 (1837). Some fifty years
later the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a father who had hit his daughter
30 times with a "small limb," choked her until her tongue hung out of her mouth and
threw her violently to the ground, thereby dislocating her thumb, could not be found
criminally liable. State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 488, 491-92 (1886). Similarly, a bizarre
South Carolina statute enacted in 1712 seems to permit parents to correct their
children by stabbing them and provides that, if the child is unintentionally killed as a
result of such correction, the parent is not criminally responsible. S.C. Code Ann. §
16-3-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
27. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix,
and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 304 (1972).
28. See State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 488, 490 (1886); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
371, 206 N.W. 173, 175 (1925); W. Tiffany, Handbook on the Law of Persons and
Domestic Relations § 124, at 264-65 (2d ed. 1909). The privilege allows a parent or
one who stands in the place of a parent to use reasonable force, including corporal
punishment, for discipline and control. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 27, at 136.
29. W. Tiffany, supra note 28, § 124, at 267.
30. Fines rather than jail terms were usually imposed if the child had not died.
See Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395 (1869) ($300 fine for putting kerosene on a blind
child to rid him of vermin and then keeping the child in a cold, damp cellar for
several days during the winter); State v. Washington, 104 La. 443, 29 S. 55 (1900)
($20 fine for beating a ten-year-old with a switch, permanently scarring the child);
Snowden v. State, 12 Tex. Crim. 105 (1882) ($25 fine for aggravated assault and
battery); Kief v. State, 10 Tex. Crim. 286 (1881) ($130 fine for threatening daughter
with a razor). But see State v. Koonse, 123 Mo. App. 655, 101 S.W. 139 (1907) (six-
month jail term and $100 fine for forcing child to run 4 miles barefoot over a rocky
[Vol. 50
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Direct intervention by the state or its agencies provided an alterna-
tive method to protect the child. Nonetheless, even though the state
stands as parens patriae to its citizens and as such has the responsibil-
ity to protect its juvenile citizens, 3' until recently the state did not
intervene to protect children. Beginning in the sixteenth century, the
state occasionally separated poor children from their parents to save
state money by putting the children to work.32 The state eventually
expanded its power to permit intervention when a child was being
abused, 33 thus raising the possibility of the government depriving
parents of custody for a reason other than poverty or as an incident of
their incarceration. In actuality, however, until well into this cen-
tury, poverty remained the primary reason for separating a child from
his parents.3
B. The Development of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine in the
United States
1. The Early Cases
Viewed against this history of almost unbridled parental authority,
it is not surprising that no American child tortiously injured by his
parents had ever sought to recover damages until late in the nine-
teenth century.35 When such a claim was finally made, the response
of the courts was to promulgate the doctrine of parental immunity.3
In Hewlett v. George,37 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that
[t]he peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
road while hitting him with a buggy whip and, on other occasions, hitting the child
with a heavy whip); State v. Bost, 125 N.C. 707, 34 S.E. 650 (1899) (12 months in
prison for assault and brutal treatment).
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); Ex parte Sharp, 15
Idaho 120, 130, 96 P. 563, 565 (1908); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).
32. G. Payne, supra note 17, at 316-18; Areen, supra note 24, at 894-95.
33. Areen, supra note 24, at 903; Thomas, supra note 27, at 306-13. See gener-
ally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 719, 722-27 (1979) (history of state intervention in the family).
34. Areen, supra note 24, at 899-900.
35. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
36. See id. at 711, 9 So. at 887; McKelvey v. McKelvey, Ill Tenn. 388, 390-93,
77 S.W. 664, 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 246-47, 79 P. 788, 788-89
(1905). The early authorities are in some confusion about the possibility of a child
recovering for injuries inflicted by his parent. See McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1059-
63. One early commentator noted that, while such a suit was theoretically possible,
"the policy of permitting actions that ... invite the child to contest the parent's
authority is so questionable, that we may well doubt if the right will ever be
sanctioned." T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise
Independent of Contract *171.
37. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
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the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to
appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. 38
The Hewlett court neither cited authority for this holding, nor gave
any further explanation of its reasoning. Nevertheless, courts in all
except eight states3" followed the Hewlett court's example and, usu-
ally without any meaningful discussion of the child's rights, adopted
some type of parent-child immunity. 40
38. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
39. Parental immunity has never been adopted in Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, North
and South Dakota, Utah or Vermont. See infra Appendix. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming held that Montana would not permit a minor to sue his parent for personal
injuries, Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 37-39, 269 P.2d 302, 304-05 (1954), but no
Montana court has so held. The Supreme Court of Montana, in a case involving the
husband-wife immunity, did state that intrafamily immunity was valid. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 488, 5,14 P.2d 444, 448 (1975).
40. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Owens v. Auto Mut.
Indem., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Purcell v. Frazer, 7 Ariz. App. 5, 435 P.2d
736 (1967), overruled, Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970)
(en bane); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Trudell v.
Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931), overruled, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d
914, 923, 479 P.2d 648, 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1971) (en bane); Horton v.
Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974) (en bane); Mesite v. Kirehstein, 109
Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976);
Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Wright v. Wright, 85
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560
(1980); Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577 (1895), limited sub silentlo, Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 205-06, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968); Vaughan v.
Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa
713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968), limited, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89
(Iowa 1981); Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954), limited, Harlan
Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Ky. 1961); Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29
(Me. 1966), overruled, Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 640 (Me. 1979); Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13
N.E.2d 438 (1938), limited, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 368-69, 339
N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926),
overruled, Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972); Miller v.
Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924), overruled sub silentio, Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263
S.W.2d 29 (1953), limited sub silentio, Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669
(1979) (en bane); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 NW.2d 16 (1959); Strong v.
Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954), overruled, Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,
405, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1974); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563
(1954), overruled, Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 440, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (1966);
Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960), overruled, France v. A.P.A.
Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 507, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970); Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M.
139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551
(1928), overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193,
297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923);
Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Tucker v.
Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771
(1964); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957), overruled, Falco v. Pados,
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The rationales consistently advanced by courts in adopting parental
immunity were first set out in the "great trilogy" of cases that estab-
lished the rule: 41 Hewlett v. George,42 McKelvey v. McKelvey43 and
Roller v. Roller.44 In Hewlett, the court advanced only one reason
for parental immunity: Family harmony would be disrupted by per-
mitting such suits.45 In McKelvey, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
relied heavily on the Hewlett rationale, but also recognized a com-
mon-law parental right to control and chastise the child."' In addi-
tion, the McKelvey court analogized parent-child immunity to inter-
spousal immunity.47
444 Pa. 372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131
A. 198 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930), ocerruded sub
silentio, Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 137, 268 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1980); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d
636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), limited, Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 SAV.2d 928, 933
(Tex. 1971); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934), limited,
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), limited, Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416,
610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (en bane); Securo v. Securo, 110 V. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750
(1931), overruled, Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1976); Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927), overruled, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410,
122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954); see La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:571 (West 1965) (adopted by statute).
41. "The Hewellette [sic], McKelvey and Roller cases constitute the great trilogy
upon which the American rule of parent-child tort immunity is based.' Tort Actions,
supra note 2, at 182.
42. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (action by a married daughter against her
mother's estate for injury due to false imprisonment).
43. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (action by a child against his father and
stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment).
44. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (action by daughter against father for rape).
45. 68 Miss. at 705, 9 So. at 887. Other cases adopting this rationale include:
Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Trudell v.
Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 680, 300 P. 7, 8 (1931), overruled, Gibson v. Gibson, 3
Cal. 3d 914, 923, 479 P.2d 648, 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1971) (en bane);
Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (quoting 39 Am. Jur.
Parent & Child § 90, at 735 (1942)); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 717-18, 156
N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (1968), limited, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89
(Iowa 1981); Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 142, 420 P.2d 127, 129 (1966); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 581, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67,
68 (Okla. 1964); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 133, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925);
Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 635, 354 S.W.2d 789, 791 (1962); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), limited, Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 262, 212
N.W. 787, 787 (1927), overruled, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d
193, 198 (1963).
46. 111 Tenn. at 388, 77 S.W. at 664; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. 111 Tenn. at 389, 77 S.W. at 665; accord Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480,
482, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1938), limited, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 368-
69, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789
(1905), limited, Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980)
(en bane).
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In Roller, the daughter sought damages from her father for rape.4"
The court, therefore, could not rely on the argument that parental
immunity was necessary to advance family harmony and parental
discipline, because the family unit had already dissolved. 49 Instead,
the court relied on the analogy to spousal immunity50 and further
argued that if liability were found, the wrongdoing parent might
reacquire the child's tort damages in the event that the child prede-
ceased the parent.5' The court contended that this would violate the
prohibition against a tortfeasor profiting from his wrong.52 Addition-
ally, the Roller court reasoned that payment to the injured child
would deplete the parent's assets, in some instances to the detriment of
the plaintiff's siblings. 53
2. An Evaluation of the Rationales Advanced in Support of
Parent-Child Immunity
These early rationales for parental immunity have been soundly
criticized, 54 and although they raise issues of genuine social concern,
they cannot justify the inequities caused by retention of the immunity.
The rationale that parent-child immunity should exist by analogy to
husband-wife immunity, advanced by both the Roller and McKelvey
courts, fails because the legal unity of the husband and wife, which
was the basis for spousal immunity, never existed between parent and
child. 55 At common law, marriage fused the legal identities of hus-
band and wife; 56 for many purposes the woman no longer had an
individual legal identity. She could neither sue a third person,5 7 nor be
sued. 58 She was instead represented in legal matters by her hus-
band. 59 One effect of this merger was the inability of an individual to
48. 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P. at 789.
49. Id. at 242-43, 79 P. at 788-89.
50. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
51. Id.
52. Id.; accord Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110
(1968), limited, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1981); Cowgtll v.
Boock, 189 Or. 282, 299, 218 P.2d 445, 452 (1950) (en bane).
53. 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789; accord Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 299,
218 P.2d 445, 452 (1950) (en bane).
54. E.g., 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts §§ 8.11, 13.4 (1956); W.
Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 865-68; McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1072-82.
55. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 574, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (1952); W.
Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 864-65.
56. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 186, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972) (en bane)
(quoting W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 859-60); W. Holdsworth, supra note 18,
at 525-33; McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1031-35.
57. Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323, 323 (1861); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156,
158-59 (1866).
58. Stockton v. Farley, 10 W. Va. 171, 173-74 (1877); W. Holdworth, supra note
18, at 531-32.
59. Norris v. Lantz, 18 Md. 260, 269 (1861) (husband entered contract on wife's
behalf); Farrar v. Bessey, 24 Vt. 89, 90 (1852) (same).
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sue his spouse, because to do so would have been to sue himself."
The common law, however, never treated children as mere extensions
of their parents. 61  Children had separate legal identities and could
both sue and be sued.6 2 A child's suit against his parents, therefore,
did present adversity, and at common law a child could maintain an
action against his parents to protect his property63 and contract
rights.6r Thus, the reason for interspousal immunity does not exist as
to suits between parent and child. The existence of the first immunity
provides no reason to establish the second.
Similarly, the Roller court's speculative fear that the injured child's
recovery may be inherited by the wrongdoing parent 5 is not a persua-
sive reason for parental immunity. The injured child should not be
required to remain uncompensated because of the rather remote possi-
bility that he may die before he reaches majority, and if the parent is
alive at the time, he may inherit a portion of the money formerly paid
in compensation.6 6 Such a sequence of events is highly unlikely and
might never occur because all of the compensatory funds could be
spent prior to the child's death. Moreover, if the parent had paid the
damages from his own resources, an inheritance of the funds would
constitute a return, rather than a profit. Only if the injured child had
been paid by an insurance company would it be possible for the
inherited money to be a profit. Beyond this consideration is the recog-
nition that, if the child had died from causes other than the tortious
injury, the parent would not be profiting from his wrongdoing, but
60. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 860; see Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117
Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898) (suit by wife against husband for infecting her with
venereal disease dismissed for lack of adversity). See generally Kahn-Freund, Incon-
sistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 Mod. L. Rev. 133
(1952) (history of tort liability between husband and wife); McCurdy, Personal
Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Viii. L. Rev. 303 (1959) (same).
61. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 864.
62. See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 379 (1854); W. Prosser, supra note 5, §
122, at 864.
63. See Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925) (deed of trust set
aside for undue influence); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903) (trust
belongs to minor, not parent, if paid for with child's money); Lamb v. Lamb, 146
N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895) (rent can be collected by child from mother if there is an
agreement that mother will pay rent).
64. See Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Coller
v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963); W. Prosser, supra note
5, § 122, at 864-65; cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 353, 150 A. 905, 906 (1930)
("There has never been a common-law rule that a child could not sue [his] parent. It
is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea and to treat the suits
which have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule.").
65. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244-45, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905), limited,
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (en banc).
66. If the victim had voluntarily elected to bestow his wealth on the parent who
had caused the injury, it would be of no concern to the court. Therefore, this
problem would arise only when the child died before he was legally able to make a
will.
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from his status as a beneficiary under intestate succession laws,0 7
which represent a completely distinct set of social values. 08 If, on the
other hand, the child had died from the tortious injury, the parent
would often be prevented from recovering by wrongful death laws.00
Finally, if the courts or legislatures believe that the possibility of a
wrongdoing parent inheriting part of his child's awarded damages is
against social policy, the remedy should be to directly prohibit the
inheritance, not to immunize the wrongdoer.
The irrationality of this justification for parental immunity is fur-
ther highlighted by one of the widely-held exceptions to the immu-
nity: the liability of parents to their children for tortious conduct that
was intentional, wanton or, in some cases, grossly negligent. 70 Pre-
sumably the intentional or wanton tortfeasor is less entitled to inherit
from his victim than is the merely negligent tortfeasor, yet the possi-
bility of such an inheritance has not kept courts from holding these
parents liable.
The third reason given by the Roller court for parental immunity-
that to pay the injured child would deplete the family treasury to the
detriment of other innocent family members 71-fails to address the
central issue: whether sufficient reason exists to require the innocent
victim of the tort to bear the burden of his injuries so that his siblings
67. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-272 to -287 (West 1981); Fi. Stat.
Ann. §§ 732.101 to .109 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law
§§ 4-1.1 to -1.5 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1981-1982).
68. The state laws governing the disposition of an intestate's property commonly
express a preference for succession by the decedent's spouse and children. See gener-
ally Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 241 (1963); Rolison, Principles of the Law of Succession
to Intestate Property, 11 Notre Dame Law. 14 (1935).
69. See Hall v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 224 (D.S.C. 1974) (construing S.C.
Code Ann. § 10-1951 (Law. Co-op. 1962)); Helling v. Lew, 28 Cal. App. 3d 434, 104
Cal. Rptr. 789 (1972) (construing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377 (West 1973)).
70. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D.D.C. 1968); Emery v.
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429-30, 289 P.2d 218, 223-24 (1955) (en bane); Horton v.
Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974) (en banc); Wright v. Wright,
85 Ga. App. 721, 724-25, 70 S.E.2d 152, 154-55 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206,
210-12, 61 N.E. 961, 963 (1901); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923,
926 (1951); Rodebaugh v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 4 Mich. App. 559, 561-67, 145
N.W.2d 401, 405-06 (1966); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958) (per curiam) (adopting opinion of Dew, Spec. Comm'r), revd on other
grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
361, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930); Decker v. Decker, 20 Vlisc. 2d 438, 440-41, 193
N.Y.S.2d 431, 433-34 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117,
119-20, 216 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1966); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 301, 218 P.2d
445, 453 (1950) (en bane); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954), limited, Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971);
Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 37-38, 406 P.2d 323, 327 (1965).
71. 37 Wash. at 245. 79 P. at 789.
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can avoid a possible decrease in either their standard of living or
anticipated inheritance. In directly analogous actions, the courts have
routinely ordered the parents to pay damages to one child, without
showing the same solicitude for the financial well-being of other
family members. Property and contract actions between parent and
child have always been allowed.7 2  Recovery has also been permitted
under exceptions to parental immunity, 3 such as when the parent
intentionally injured the child.74 In addition, the state has been able
to fine parents when their conduct toward their children contravened
the criminal law,75 notwithstanding the consequent financial depriva-
tion of both the innocent siblings and the injured child.70
Whenever a defendant is held liable for damages, his family trea-
sury will be depleted, and the resources available to the defendant's
innocent children will consequently be decreased. This burden is an
inevitable result of permitting recovery. The only difference betveen
the usual case and the parent-child suit is that the plaintiff child is
related to the children whose financial interests are affected. This
single factor has not been deemed sufficient to prohibit recovery in
analogous situations, and neither renders the innocent victim of the
tort less in need of compensation, nor makes his siblings more worthy
of protection.
Furthermore, no child has a legal right to his parents' property, to
equal treatment by his parents, or to an equal percentage of his
parents' estate. 77  Consequently, a parent has the right to divert his
72. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 54, § 8.11, at 647-48; McCurdy I,
supra note 2, at 1057-58; supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 99-
100 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 762,
611 P.2d 135, 137 (1980); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356, 364, 150 A. 905,
907, 911 (1930); King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 296, 75 P.2d 130, 131 (1938); Coller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
73. For example, emancipated children may sue their parents for personal inju-
ries. See cases cited infra note 134. Suits are also permitted when the injury is
incurred in a business context, see cases cited infra note 138, and if the tortfeasor is
dead. See cases cited infra note 136.
74. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 30.
76. The state treasury is thus enriched, while the injured child is required by law
to remain uncompensated to avoid decreasing his siblings' shares of the family
wealth.
77. See, e.g., Roberts v. Bryant, 201 So. 2d 811, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Newkirk v. Knight, 456 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Okla. 1969). In Rice v. Andrews, 127
Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926), the court stated: "'One has the legal
right ... to disinherit any natural heir or next of kin, and if he chooses to cut off his
child and will his property to others, such child has no claim against his father's
estate for his support and maintenance, but must shift for himself, or be dependent
upon others for his support." Id. at 827-28, 217 N.Y.S. at 530. There is no certainty,
therefore, that even if innocent siblings exist their inheritance will be affected by the
plaintiff's recovery.
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property to a particular child and can do so without violating the
rights of other family members regardless of whether their standard of
living or patrimony may be decreased thereby. Finally, the injured
child is not profiting from his recovery but is merely receiving com-
pensation for an injury that he has suffered. 78 A damage award
represents the equitable treatment of returning the child to his status
quo. 7
9
Two other factors evince the paucity of logic behind this reason for
the immunity. First, there will be cases in which there are no innocent
siblings who could be prejudiced by a depletion of the family estate.
Nonetheless, the immunity shields all parents regardless of the size of
their family. Second, to the extent that insurance proceeds cover the
award, family funds will not be depleted by payment of damages. If
anything, under these circumstances recovery will serve to maintain
the family's original standard of living by relieving the parents of
expenses they might otherwise incur. 0
The availability of insurance proceeds has, however, been cited as a
reason to retain parental immunity." ' Because a child has only lim-
ited knowledge and ability in legal matters, the decision to sue is
usually made by his parents.82 There can be no doubt that when
78. In cases of severe injuries, society may be required to support the plaintiff
when he becomes an adult if the injury has rendered him unable to support himself.
In cases in which this public burden could have been avoided or mitigated by
permitting the plaintiff to recover from the defendant, society is subsidizing the
tortfeasor and perhaps other members of the plaintiff's family. There is no justifica-
tion for such a hidden subsidy.
79. See McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1073. McCurdy suggests that it is the policy
of the law to protect a minor's property. When a child's physical and mental abilities
are impaired, his potential earning -power is decreased and his capital in his own
future is consequently diminished. An award of damages is compensation for this
impairment. Id.
80. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141-42 (1980);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 531-32 (1969); Coller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197
(1963).
81. See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Dennis v.
Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C. 1968); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 722,
156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1968), limited, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89
(Iowa 1981); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 483, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1938),
limited, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 368-69, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975);
Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 252-53, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960), overruled,
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 507, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970); Parks v.
Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 296, 135 A.2d 65, 71 (1957), overruled, Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
82. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C. 1968); Hastings v. Hast-
ings, 33 N.J. 247, 252-53, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960), overruled, France v. A.P.A.
Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 507, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970); cf. Streenz v. Streenz,
106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (en bane) (child will not sue uninsured
parent); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975)
(same).
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insurance will pay for all or part of the plaintiff's recovery there is an
incentive for family members to conspire to obtain an unjustified
award at the expense of the insurance company.8 3
The likelihood of collusion, however, may be lessened by the in-
sured's duty to cooperate with the insurance company in its de-
fense. 4 Moreover, the possibility that some litigants in a particular
class may be guilty of fraud or collusion does not require the courts to
deny relief to everyone in that class, many of whom are admittedly
deserving.8 5 Any rule that seeks to incidentally avoid fraud by with-
holding legal protection from all claimants, regardless of the justice of
their claims, "employs a medieval technique which, however satisfy-
ing it may be to defendants, . . . is scarcely in keeping with the
acknowledged function of a modern legal system." 861 Indeed, some
courts have held that a state may not constitutionally rely solely on the
danger of collusion to deny an entire class of people the right to bring
suit.
7
Rather than prohibit the child's cause of action because of the
possibility of fraud and collusion, courts can instruct the jury to
exercise caution in assessing the claims asserted.88 Courts have felt
83. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insur-
ance, 57 Yale L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
84. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980)
("Lack of cooperation may be found in inconsistent or contradictory statements by
the insured or in collusion between the injured part' and the insured which results in
false statements to the company."); see Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 365,
339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975) ("The parent is usually represented by counsel provided
by the insurance company. Such counsel is ever alert to protect the interests of the
insurance company and ready to expose any attempts at collusive and fraudulent
conduct. Any overt attempt at collusion constitutes a criminal offense and will be
punishable as such.").
85. As the court said in Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973), "[a]
generalized policy concern to prevent fraud or collusion... [is] insufficiently
weighty to render tolerable the basic unfairness and inequity inhering in the denial of
a remedy to one who has suffered wrong at the hands of another. . . . [The courts
should] not have so little trust in the general ethics and honor of our citizenry, and in
the abilities of our judges and jurors to discern the genuine from the spurious, that
[they] must take refuge in [this] kind of unselective 'overkill."' Id. at 229; see
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980).
86. Leflar & Sanders, Mental Suffering and Its Consequence-Arkansas Law, 7
U. Ark. L. Sch. Bull. 43, 60 (1939).
87. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 859-60, 506 P.2d 212, 215, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388, 391 (1973) (en banc); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 761-62, 518 P.2d 362,
370-71 (1974).
88. See Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 113, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939). If
legislators think that insurance companies need protection from fraudulent claims,
they could enact statutes providing that injuries to the insured's child are not covered
by the policy unless the policy explicitly extends such coverage. Cf. N.Y. Ins. Law §
167(3) (McKinney 1966). This statute provides that: "No policy or contract shall be
deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to
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competent to deal with the possibility of fraudulent suits between
others in intimate relationships 9 as well as in those suits allowed as
exceptions to parental immunity. 0 It is unreasonable to expect more
undetectable fraudulent conduct when a child sues his parent for
negligently inflicted personal injuries.
The most convincing rationales advanced in support of parent-child
immunity are those which allege that the immunity is necessary to the
smooth functioning of the parent-child relationship in that the immu-
nity fosters domestic tranquility and serves to maintain parental au-
thority.9 1 Even these rationales, however, are not unassailable.
The domestic tranquility allegedly fostered by the immunity arises
from a "procedural disability [of the child] to sue. . . and not from a
lack of a violated duty."' 92 The refusal to permit the injured party to
sue does not eliminate the conflict. The loss, and thus the conflict,
exists regardless of the immunity: "[I]t is the injury itself which is the
disruptive act." 93 To prohibit suit in the name of domestic harmony
is to allege "that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the
family." 94
The immunity merely ensures that the existing loss will be borne by
the injured party, rather than, as in the normal case, shifted to the
tortfeasor. There is no reason to believe that allocating the loss to the
victim will produce less disharmony than requiring the tortfeasor to
shoulder the burden, especially in light of the constant contact be-
tween the uncompensated child and the parent inherent in the family
relationship. 95
his or her spouse ... unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included
in the policy." Id. In view of the lack of evidence of collusion, such a statute would
seem to be unnecessary.
89. See, e.g., Overlock v. Rudemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960) (sister
vs. brother); Wilkins v. Kane, 74 N.J. Super. 414, 181 A.2d 417 (Law Div. 1962)
(grandchild vs. grandmother); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939)
(brother vs. sister); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948)
(same); Herrell v. Haney, 207 Tenn. 532, 341 S.W.2d 574 (1960) (brother vs.
brother); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960) (same); Munsert v.
Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938) (same).
90. See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955)
(en bane) (emancipated child suing parent); Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152
S.E. 278 (1930) (same); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963)
(child suing parent for injury inflicted by parent in business capacity).
91. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. 1960) (en bane) (emphasis
omitted); accord Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864, 867 (Utah 1981).
93. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); accord Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1971) (en
bane); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 360, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975).
94. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 866.
95. See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (1980);
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
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The existence of liability insurance further undermines the validity
of the domestic tranquility rationale. When the parent carries insur-
ance, the "action between parent and child is not truly [adversar-
ial]" 96 because in reality it is "between [the] child and [the] parent's
insurance carrier." 97 Additionally, insurance proceeds may provide a
fund that would actually alleviate family disharmony by removing
the financial burden caused by an unexpected injury. 8
The domestic tranquility rationale is also discredited by the recogni-
tion that there has never been a bar to suits between parent and child
for actions in property"9 or contract, 00 even though these disputes
present the same potential for friction as personal injury suits.' 0'
Indeed, even personal injury suits between parents and children have
been permitted when they fall within a recognized exception to paren-
tal immunity. 0 2 There is no reason why any of these suits would be
less acrimonious than suits for personal injuries negligently in-
flicted. 0 3
One final factor further undercuts the family harmony rationale for
the immunity: The courts do not act to protect the family from the
friction inherent in litigation when to do so would be detrimental to
injured third parties. If, for example, a parent in the presence of his
child negligently injures a third party, the courts do not protect family
harmony by prohibiting the child from testifying against his parent in
the suit brought by the injured person,0 4 yet the potential for dishar-
96. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975).
97. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (en bane).
98. "The child's suit, if successful, will provide a fund to care for its injuries
which might otherwise be unavailable. Far from upsetting family ties, the suit is
actually an incident in the course of a family's provident management of its affairs."
Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 479, 174 N.E.2d 718, 723, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 41
(1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting), overruled, Gelbman v. Celbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438,
245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969); accord Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122
N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
99. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 10 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz.
86, 87-88, 471 P.2d 282, 283-84 (1970) (en banc); NV. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at
865; McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1057; see cases cited supra note 63.
100. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 87-88, 471 P.2d 282, 283-84 (1970) (en
banc); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); see sources
cited supra note 64.
101. The result of this distinction is that the law protects "the property rights of a
minor more zealously than the rights of his person." Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402,
410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; inJra notes 134-41 and accompa-
nying text.
103. "It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of reason, logic or law
... it can be said that domestic harmony would be undisturbed in one case [as when
the child is emancipated] and be upset in the other [as when the child is a minor]."
Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 576, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
104. See Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L. Rev.
771, 773-75 (1979). But see Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privi-
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mony engendered by this litigation approximates that present where
the parent-child immunity is applied.
The only basis for distinguishing the two situations would seem to
be that when the plaintiff is not a family member, whatever dishar-
mony is created does not affect him, whereas, when he is a member of
the family, he is adversely affected by any discord that may be created
by the litigation. Such a distinction does not explain why one plaintiff
may receive compensation for his injuries while another is told that
recovery is prohibited as a matter of law. Certainly potential plaintiffs
should consider the possibility that the value of their recovery may be
diminished by other factors; however, such a possibility is no reason to
deny a tort victim the opportunity to decide whether he wants to be
compensated despite the risk of creating disharmony among members
of his family. If the fear of disharmony in the family is insufficient to
prevent a third party from subjecting families to the friction inherent
in litigation by requiring a child to testify against his parents, it should
not be sufficient to prevent the injured child from deciding to seek
compensation for his injuries.
An additional rationale advanced in support of parental immunity
is that those charged with responsibility for disciplining and control-
ling their children should not be liable in tort, because such liability
would undermine parental authority and discretion. 10 5 There are
two levels on which this rationale can arguably support the immunity.
First, it can be contended that permitting any suit by a child against
his parent will undermine parental authority. The number and vari-
ety of suits that children have always been permitted to bring against
their parents demonstrates that courts have not accepted this conten-
tion. 106
The second, and more convincing, level on which the parental
authority and discretion argument is used relates to the parental
lege and Spoil the Child, 74 Dick. L. Rev. 599, 600 n.5 (1970) (in some parts of
Europe, relatives by blood or marriage are incompetent to testify as witnesses and
can claim a privilege against self-incrimination if asked to testify against members of
their families). Marital communications are, of course, privileged. C. McCormick,
Handbook of the Law of Evidence §§ 78-86, at 161-74 (2d ed. 1972).
105. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 717-18, 156 N.W.2d 105, 107-09
(1968), limited, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1981); Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425,
428, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237-38 (1942), overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969); Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C.
302, 305, 157 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1967); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 262, 212 N.W.
787, 787 (1927), overruled, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193,
198 (1963). While this rationale lends some support to cases prohibiting children
from suing their parents, it is irrelevant, and in fact may militate against the
immunity, in cases where the immunity protects children from suits by their parents.
This is true for most of the rationales for the immunity.
106. See sources cited supra notes 63-64, 70 and accompanying text; injra notes
134-41 and accompanying text.
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conduct that injured the child. In this context, it is helpful to distin-
guish between parental authority and parental discretion. Although
there is some overlap between protecting parental authority and pro-
tecting the right of parents to raise their children by their own
methods and in accordance with their own attitudes, these two goals
of the immunity will usually be relevant in different situations.
The reluctance to undermine parental authority should be a factor
only when the injury results from an exercise of that authority. If, for
example, a child could successfully sue his parent for ever), technical
battery, parental authority would be seriously undermined. The ex-
ception to the immunity for intentional torts, however, indicates that
courts have not been persuaded that the parents' need to maintain
authority justifies the immunity, because it is by intentional conduct
that a parent exerts his authority. 0 7 Furthermore, there is no evi-
dence that the abolition of the immunity for intentional conduct has
resulted in any loss of parental authority. 08
The more persuasive basis of this rationale is the defense of the
parents' right to raise their children, even when the), elect to do so in
an unorthodox manner. This parental right has been afforded consti-
tutional protection,10 9 and thus it might be argued that parental
immunity merely implements this right. Some courts fear that with-
out immunity, juries might express their disapproval of unusual child-
rearing practices by invariably awarding damages to children in cases
where the parents' unconventional conduct was arguably not tor-
tious. °10 Such a result would effectively curtail the exercise of consti-
107. When dealing with intentional conduct, courts have relied on a privilege that
permits parents to use reasonable force to discipline their children. Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 281, 95 N.W. 640, 642 (1903); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 372-73,
206 N.W. 173, 175 (1925). For cases in which actions against a parent were main-
tained for willful or malicious conduct, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 451-62 (1951).
108. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
109. Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (recognition of parents' right to be
free of undue, adverse interference by state); Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (recognition that parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (recognition of parents' primary role in
child-rearing as a "fundamental interest" and "an enduring American tradition");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder."). The integrity of the family unit has found protection against arbitrary
state interference in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 63940 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the ninth amend-
ment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, I., concurring).
110. Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980); Holodook
v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 48-50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345-46, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 870-71
(1974).
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tutionally guaranteed parental discretion in matters of child-rearing.
Moreover, the parent's relationship to his child involves both rights
and duties,"' and courts, cognizant of the heavy responsibility im-
posed on a parent to raise his child,1 2 are sensitive to the external
factors affecting that responsibility. Parents whose "[p]hysical, mental
or financial weakness [causes them] to provide what many a reason-
able man would consider substandard maintenance, guidance, educa-
tion and recreation for their children, and in many instances to pro-
vide a family home which is not reasonably safe as a place of
abode, '"" 3 might be unduly burdened by permitting a suit.
Nonetheless, even the importance of maintaining parental discre-
tion cannot justify requiring the child victims of tortious conduct to
remain uncompensated. Parents do not possess complete discretion in
raising their children. 11 4 The parent's discretionary right ends at the
point where the child's rights begin. "5 The courts routinely intervene
when the parent's conduct is criminal or where the child's physical or
mental health is endangered." 6 As of 1974, every state provided for
court intervention in the family to protect children." 7 Pursuant to
these statutes, courts remove approximately seventy-five thousand
children a year from their parents' homes." 8 Permitting a child's suit
for personal injury damages involves significantly less infringement of
ill. "Parenthood places a grave responsibility upon the father and mother. It is
their duty to rear and discipline the child. In rearing the child, the parents must
provide a home and perform tasks around the home and on the premises." Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 656, 251 P.2d 149, 156 (1952); accord Lemmen v. Servais,
39 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968).
112. See McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1059.
113. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 381, 397 P.2d 771, 774 (1964) (en bane);
accord Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 428-29, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237-38 (1942),
overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969).
114. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp.
1242, 1262-64 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
115. See Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on
the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 769, 816 (1978). Even the
common-law parental privilege to discipline a child is limited to the use of reasonable
force. See W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 27, at 136-37.
116. Note, Due Process for Parents in Emergency Protection Proceedings Under
the Texas Family Code-Suggestions for Improving the System, 15 Hous. L. Rev.
709, 713-14 (1978); Note, Termination of Parental Rights-Suggested Reforms and
Responses, 16 J. Fam. L. 239, 242-44 (1977-1978).
117. Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 Fam. L.Q. 1,
10-11 (1975).
118. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 625, 625-26 (1976).
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parental discretion than does the removal of the child from the par-
ents' control.119
Additionally, parents engage in intentional conduct when they ex-
ercise their discretion, yet there is no evidence that permitting suit by
children against their parents for intentional torts has significantly
eroded parents' ability to raise their children. The jury has been
permitted to "second guess" parents as to whether the amount of force
used to discipline a child was reasonable, and therefore privileged.'20
With sufficient guidance from the judge, a jury should be able to
evaluate the parents' running of the household, or any other conduct
by which the child has been injured, without significantly eroding
parents' discretion.
The concern for the "physical, mental or financial weakness" of the
parent is not particularly persuasive. The argument regarding physi-
cal weakness is totally specious because in negligence cases an allow-
ance is made for the defendant's physical infirmities.Y2  Although
concern for the parent of substandard intelligence has some appeal, no
reason is apparent why it should outveigh concern for the injured
child, or why the law should protect the person of substandard intelli-
gence when he acts as a parent, but not otherwise. 22  Furthermore,
even if a court decided that a parent's mental deficiencies require the
child to remain uncompensated, no reason exists to extend the immu-
nity to all parents regardless of their mental capabilities.
The solicitude expressed for parents with limited financial resources
also suffers from a lack of cogency. A parent who, for example, is
financially unable to provide a reasonably safe home will probably
not be sued for damages because it is very unlikely that he could pay a
substantial judgment. Beyond this practicality, there is the legal prin-
ciple that a defendant's poverty is not a factor in determining whether
he should be held liable for damages tortiously caused.'2 3 Moreover,
119. "The total extinction of a familial relationship between children and their
biological parents is the most drastic measure that a state can impose, short of
criminal sanctions, to protect disadvantaged or neglected children." Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 163 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). In addition to being a drastic measure, removal of the child
from the home is made even more intrusive in that it is accomplished by resort to
statutes that are often very broad in their application. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp.
769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (overturning termination statute as void for vagueness);
Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 12 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (same), affd, 545
F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Note, Due Process and the Fundamental Right to Family
Integrity: A Re-evaluation of South Dakota's Parental Termination Statute, 24 S.D.
L. Rev. 447, 455-60 (1979).
120. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 27, at 136.
121. Id. § 32, at 151-52.
122. Id. at 152-54.
123. Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 156 N.W.2d
466, 471 (1968); W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 5, at 22-23.
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even if there were some reason to protect poor parents from liability,
that would not support this overbroad immunity which prevents all
injured children from recovering.
Finally, there are many types of negligent conduct-for example,
negligently driving a car or leaving a loaded revolver where a toddler
is playing-which have nothing to do with the parents' authority
within the family or their discretion in raising their children. As to
injuries caused by this type of tort, the parental discretion rationale
for the immunity is totally inapplicable.
In cases of neglect and criminal conduct, and those for damages
inflicted by intentional torts, the courts have shown themselves able to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible parental conduct.
There is no reason to believe that they will not be able to make similar
distinctions in personal injury cases founded on a parent's negligence
toward his child. The absence of complaints in those states that have
abrogated the immunity 124 is further evidence that the immunity is
not necessary to protect legitimate parental discretion. Clearly, com-
plete immunity for negligently caused injury is not required to protect
parents' right to raise their children.
II. LIMITATIONS ON PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
The parent-child immunity rule, as promulgated at the turn of the
century, presented an absolute bar to a child's tort action against his
-parent.2 -5 As has been shown, the policy considerations advanced to
support the rule are not adequate.12 6  In the ninety years since the
initial adoption of the immunity, society's view of the child, and the
parent-child relationship, has changed radically. Children are now
viewed as individuals with rights of their own, 127 and the parent-child
relationship has become more egalitarian. 128 Children are no longer
regarded as evil beings who must be beaten down; instead they are
viewed as reasonable, friendly people who will not take advantage of
their parents if they are treated nicely. 29
This moderation of attitude towards children has coincided with an
increase in the use of liability insurance and the consequent decrease
in direct parental financial responsibility in the event of a child's law-
124. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
125. W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 122, at 865.
126. See supra pt. I(B)2.
127. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967); Margolin, Salvation Versus Liberation: The Movement for
Children's Rights in a Historical Context, 25 Soc. Probs. 441, 447 (1978).
128. See U. Bronfenbrenner, Socialization and Social Class Through Time and
Space, in Readings in Social Psychology 400 (3d ed. 1958).
129. See B. Spock, The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care 19 (1946).
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suit for personal injuries.' 30 These two factors have led courts to re-
address the immunity issue in keeping with their responsibility in the
field of torts to make the law responsive to new social and economic
conditions. 3'
The response has been "to whittle away the [immunity] by statute
and by the process of interpretation, distinction and exception."' 32
When particularly egregious cases came before the courts, they bal-
anced the social benefits of the rule against its detrimental effects and
partially abrogated it by the use of exceptions. "These exceptions
reflect distaste for the injustices which often result from a strict,
pervasive application of the parental immunity rule."' 33
A. Specific Exceptions
As a general rule, the courts will fashion an exception to parental
immunity whenever the family relationship no longer exists or has
been "temporarily abandoned" in the context of the incident giving
rise to the injuries. Because the immunity ostensibly protects the
family relationship, it is no longer necessary when that relationship
ceases to exist. Thus, parental immunity will not bar a suit for per-
sonal injuries by an emancipated child against his parent '3 because
emancipation ends the parent-child relationship.' 35 Similarly, several
courts permit a child's tort action against a deceased parent's es-
tate. 136 In addition, the family relationship is deemed temporarily
130. The existence of insurance also undermines the reasons for immunity. See
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
131. See Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966). For a
review of the current status of the parent-child immunity, see infra Appendix.
132. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372., 377, 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971).
133. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (en bane).
134. E.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 253-54, 288 P.2d 86S,
873 (1955); Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 126, 110 A.2d 492, 492 (Super. Ct.
1954); Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 121, 152 S.E. 278, 279 (1930); Taubert v.
Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 248-49, 114 N.W. 763, 764 (1908); Lancaster v. Lancaster,
213 Miss. 536, 541, 57 So. 2d 302, 304-05 (1952); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.\V.2d 161,
164-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam) (adopting opinion of Dew, Spec. Comm'r),
rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en bane); Fitzgerald v. Valdez,
77 N.M. 769, 776, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967); Gilliken v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321,
139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13(1956); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 634-37, 354 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (1962);
Groh v. W.O. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 668, 271 N.W. 374, 377 (1937).
135. Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 637, 354 S.V.2d 789, 791 (1962).
136. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 420, 129-S.W.2d 245, 247 (1939); Johnson v.
Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972); Thurman v. Etherton,
459 S.W.2d 402, 402-03 (Ky. 1970); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73
(Mo. 1960) (en banc); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 317, 211 A.2d 410, 413 (1965);
Vidmar v. Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 359, 162 A.2d 15, 16 (1960). Contra Gunn
v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 308, 157 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (1967); Campbell v. Grutte-
meyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 137-40, 432 S.W.2d 894, 895-97 (1968). Courts have also
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abandoned when the parent injures the child intentionally, wantonly,
or, in some jurisdictions, with gross negligence. 37
It is also possible for a parent to take on additional roles with
respect to his child and to be held liable because the child is not
injured by the parent acting as a parent. This most commonly occurs
when the child is injured while the parent is acting in a business
context. 13 If the parent acts as the child's employer, he assumes all of
the responsibilities of an employer, including the duty to provide
reasonably safe working conditions. 139 If the child is not an em-
ployee, but is injured incidentally to the parent's transaction of busi-
ness, the parent is still liable because he abandons his parental role
while pursuing his business endeavors. 40
Recently, some courts have adopted another exception, holding
that the immunity does not apply when the injury was incurred in a
motor vehicle accident caused by the parent's negligent driving.' 4 '
allowed the action against a parent's estate on the ground that parental immunity Is a
personal defense that the parent's estate cannot assert against the child's action.
Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Georgia law); Sisler
v. Seeberger, 23 Wash. App. 612, 614-15, 596 P.2d 1362, 1363-64 (1979).
137. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 67-68, 77 A.2d 923, 925-26 (1951) (father's
murder of mother and own suicide considered malicious and willful conduct and suit
allowed for mental distress); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
138. Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 422-23, 378 P.2d 640, 642-43 (1963);
Cody v. J.A. Dodds & Sons, 252 Iowa 1394, 1398-99, 110 N.W.2d 255, 257-58
(1961); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361-63, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930); Felderhoff
v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930-31 (Tex. 1971); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11,
17, 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 657, 251 P.2d 149, 156
(1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 18-19, 166 S.F. 538, 539 (1932).
139. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 372-73, 150 A. 905, 915 (1930) (child
injured while employee of father).
140. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio 592, 595, 103 N.E.2d 743, 744 (1952) (child
burned when gasoline pump exploded at father's filling station); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 657-58, 251 P.2d 149, 157 (1952) (father driving business vehicle ran
over his son who was playing in the street).
141. Although the highest courts in four states have specifically abrogated the
immunity only for injuries suffered in car accidents, either the language of the
opinions or lower court decisions indicate that the immunity will almost certainly be
abrogated in other cases. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769-70, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); France v. A.P.A.
Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970); Lee v. Comer, 224
S.E.2d 721, 724 (W.Va. 1976). In three states the legislatures have abolished the
immunity as it applied to injuries suffered in automobile accidents. Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 52-572C (West 1981), construed in Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 51, 316
A.2d 783, 785 (1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 (.1981), construed in Triplett v.
Triplett, 34 N.C. App. 212, 215, 237 S.E.2d 546, 547 (1977); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-
210 (Law. Co-op. 1974). The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently found that
state's statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds and totally abrogated the
immunity. Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 134, 268 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1980). One other
state, by court action, has permitted recovery for automobile injuries, while retain-
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The primary reason advanced for this exception is the prevalence of
automobile insurance,142 which, to some extent, protects the parent
from having to pay damages. 43  Additionally, the act of driving
involves neither child-rearing techniques nor parental authority and
discretion. Decisions in these cases, therefore, do not interfere with
parental prerogatives. '44
Although the existence of these exceptions to parental immunity
moderates its harsh effect, the end result "is a conglomerate of para-
doxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions."' 4  The continued exis-
tence of parental immunity cannot be justified by the presence of
exceptions when the underlying rationales for the immunity are in-
valid. Indeed, the very existence of exceptions undermines these ra-
tionales. 46  Recognizing the need for more extensive action, many
courts have completely or partially abrogated parental immunity.
ing the immunity for most other injuries. Compare Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181,
183-84, 183 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1971) (child can sue parent for injuries sustained in
automobile accident caused by parent's negligent driving), with Wright v. Wright,
213 Va. 177, 179, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1972) (child cannot sue parent for injuries
sustained due to negligently placed awning). Delaware appears to hold that, to the
extent the injury is covered by automobile liability insurance, there is no immunity.
Compare Williams v.Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976) (doctrine of parental
immunity inapplicable to extent damages are covered by parent's automobile liabil-
ity insurance), with Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 683-84 (Del. 1979)(parental
immunity preserved where duty arises from family relationship notwithstanding
existence of insurance). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also held that
where the injury is incurred in a motor vehicle accident, the immunity fails to the
extent that there is insurance. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 352-53, 339
N.E.2d 907, 909 (1975). That court has more recently indicated in the context of the
husband-wife immunity, however, that the presence of insurance is not the touch-
stone of liability. See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532-33
(1976).
142. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, §§ 2118, 2904 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. §
61-6-301 (1981); cf. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 312 (McKinney 1970) (certificate of
insurance or comparable proof of financial security prerequisite to registration of
motor vehicle).
143. The argument that lawsuits between parent and child for personal injuries
will increase family disharmony is dubious and becomes more tenuous when the
defendant has insurance. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967). In these days
of large judgments, however, the possibility of a recovery exceeding the insurance
coverage should not be ignored, nor should the possibility of conflict between, for
example, a parent who is in favor of filing an unjustified suit and a child who objects
to such tactics. The latter possibility exists, however, whenever a child has been
injured, regardless of whether the potential defendant is an insured parent or some
third party.
144. See, e.g., Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1979); Wright v.
Wright, 213 Va. 177, 178-79, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1972).
145. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 377, 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971).
146. See supra notes 70, 73 and accompanying text.
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B. Abrogation of the Parent-Child Immunity
In abrogating the parental immunity rule, courts have attempted to
accommodate both the child's right to sue for tortiously inflicted
injuries and the parent's burden of rearing his child. 4 7 As a result of
such efforts, courts have reached different conclusions as to the appro-
priate breadth of the abrogation. 148 The first major alteration of the
immunity was made in Goller v. White, 149 which abrogated the rule
except where the allegedly negligent act involved either "an exercise of
parental authority ... [or] an exercise of ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and
dental services, and other care."' 50 Several courts have now adopted
this general approach. 15'
147. The immunity "is accorded the parent, not because he is a parent, but
because as a parent he pursues a course within the family constellation which society
exacts of him and which is beneficial to the state. The parental nonliability is not...
a reward, but ... a means of enabling the ... discharge [of) duties which society
exacts." Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968).
148. Some courts have never adopted the parental immunity rule, Rupert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 405, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1974); see supra note 39 and
accompanying text, or have left the extent of abrogation undefined. See Tamashiro v.
DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 79, 450 P.2d 998, 1002 (1969); France v. A.P.A. Transp.
Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d
364, 366-67 (N.D. 1967); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-22, 370 A.2d 191, 192-93
(1977); cf. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 406, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963)
(partial abrogation); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968) (same).
149. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
150. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
151. In Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 12-13, 623 P.2d 800, 801-02 (1981),
the court stated that the immunity applies only if the parent breached a duty "owed
to a child within the family sphere" rather than a duty owed to the world at large.
Id. at 14, 623 P.2d at 803. In Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971), tile
court further varied the Goller standard by not listing specific activities as to which a
parent is immune in the use of ordinary discretion. Instead, the immunity applies If
ordinary discretion was used "with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of
the child." Id. at 923. In Michigan, the Supreme Court adopted the Coller approach
but varied it by substituting the term "reasonable" for "ordinary." See Plumley v.
Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); accord Grodin v. Grodin, 102
Mich. App. 396, 401-02, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980). In 1968, Minnesota adopted
the Goller approach, Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968), but
has since abandoned it in favor of total abrogation of the immunity. Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). The lower appellate courts in Illinois
appear to have adopted an approach similar to Goller, although the exceptions where
the immunity is recognized are broader. They have abrogated the immunity except
for injuries caused by "mere negligence within the scope of the parental relation-
ship." Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 111. App. 3d 234, 236, 403
N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (1980); accord Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 I11. 2d 165,
395 N.E.2d 538 (1979). Other courts which have not expressly adopted Caller have
discussed it favorably, indicating that they may adopt that approach when the
proper case is before them. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967);
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
States which follow the Goller formulation must face two new
issues: What type of conduct is encompassed by the two vaguely
worded exceptions to the immunity, and what policy reasons justify
retaining the immunity for such conduct. In addressing the first issue,
some courts have perceived a basic problem with the Goller approach
in that the immunity applies only when the discretion used was "ordi-
nary."152 Presumably, ordinary means reasonable. This requirement
deprives the immunity of much of its meaning because if a parent
acted reasonably, he did not act negligently and thus would not
require the protection of the immunity. The possibility of liability
exists only when the parent did not exercise ordinary discretion, yet in
that instance the Goller formulation would not immunize the par-
ent.153
If the court is able to determine that the parental conduct in
question involved ordinary or reasonable discretion, it must then
decide whether that conduct falls within one of the areas of care
excepted by Goller. There has been some disagreement as to the
interpretation of these exceptions. In Wisconsin, for example, a six-
year-old who was injured while crossing the street after getting off a
school bus could not recover from her parents because, in failing to
tell her how to cross streets, the parents were exercising "ordinary
parental discretion with respect to other care of their child."15 A
three-year-old injured while crossing the street after his mother had
left him while he was watching television might recover, however,
because the mother's negligence did not fall within the "other care"
exception. 55 The rather evanescent distinction between these two
cases is apparently that the first involves the parents' failure to prop-
erly educate, while the second concerns their failure to properly su-
pervise. Similarly obscure is the legal distinction between leaving a
vaporizer where a fifteen-month-old child could spill it on himself,
which was determined to be negligent supervision,1 5 and leaving an
eight-month-old child for a few minutes where she could chew on an
extension cord, which was held to involve parental discretion with
respect to housing and other care.'5
Courts have also made some rather fine distinctions between im-
mune and non-immune conduct under the authority exception. The
152. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598-601 (Minn. 1980); Grodin v.
Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401-02, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980). Some courts that
adopted Coller have used a standard of reasonable discretion. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465
S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8. 199 N.W.2d 169, 173
(1972).
153. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
154. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 78, 158 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1968).
155. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 245-47,
201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972).
156. Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639, 644, 259 N.W.2d 170, 172 (1977).
157. Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972), overruled
sub silentio, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Mirn. 1980).
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Wisconsin courts have interpreted the parental authority exception to
embrace only "the area of discipline"; 5 8 consequently, it provides no
immunity for the parent who negligently supervises his child. '9 In
Michigan, however, negligent supervision has been held to be within
the parental authority exception,' 60 because "[t]he right to exercise
authority over a child certainly includes the responsibility to supervise
that child's behavior."' 6' Thus, although Michigan and Wisconsin
use essentially the same test for determining whether the parent-child
immunity applies, a Wisconsin parent whose child is injured because
the parent was negligent in supervising him can be held liable, while
his counterpart in Michigan who engaged in exactly the same conduct
will be immune.
Although these distinctions are not totally arbitrary, it is difficult to
glean any definitive criteria from the cases that can guide parents in
their behavior and courts in their decisions. This difficulty does not
invalidate the Goller formulation, but it does encourage a close exam-
ination of the justifications advanced in its defense. Goller and the
first cases that adopted the Goller approach 6 2 are remarkable in that,
having rejected the need for the parent-child immunity in most situa-
tions, none of them explained why the immunity should be retained in
the excepted situations. In later cases, the justifications offered are the
same as those advanced almost ninety years ago when parental immu-
nity was first adopted. 6 3 These reasons are no more persuasive in the
context of partial immunity.
Courts following Goller have alleged that family harmony will be
preserved by prohibiting suits between parent and child for injuries
arising from the assertion of parental authority or ordinary discretion
in the areas listed, 4 These courts have not explained, however, why
a suit involving "ordinary parental discretion with respect to the
158. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 201
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). Under this approach, the first exception is extremely
narrow; it applies only when a child is injured through negligent discipline. Because
discipline involves intentional conduct, it will be a rare case which will come under
the first Goller exception as interpreted by the Wisconsin courts.
159. Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261, 201 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1972);
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 201 N.W.2d
745, 753 (1972).
160. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48-49
(1975).
161. Id. at 484, 233 N.W.2d at 49.
162. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich.
1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 NW.2d 631
(1968), overruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980).
163. See supra notes 45, 91, 105 and accompanying text.
164. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485-86, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49,
(1975); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. 1971); Lemmen v.
Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968).
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provision of food,"' 6 for example, would be any more disruptive of
family harmony or parental authority than a suit in any of the nonex-
cepted situations.166
Another reason that has been offered for retaining the immunity in
the designated areas is that permitting recovery in the excepted areas
would impose a new and heavy burden on parents.' 67 This, however,
merely begs the question. Abolishing the immunity would, by defini-
tion, impose a new burden on parenthood in the sense that parents
who had been protected from liability by the immunity would face
the prospect of having to pay for the injuries they had tortiously
caused. In this sense, however, a "new burden" is imposed whenever
an established immunity is abolished. The fact that the burden of
paying is new cannot justify retention. If it could, no immunity would
ever be abolished. The issue is not whether the abolition of the immu-
nity will open the defendant to new liability-it must do so. The
question is whether there is sufficient reason to offer the immune
party the special protection that the immunity provides. The burden
rationale, therefore, is not an independent reason for retaining the
immunity.168
Some courts also reason that the immunity should be retained in the
listed instances because holding parents liable for injuries caused by
their negligence in discharging their legal duties to raise their children
will seriously impair their ability to fulfill those obligations."G This
reasoning runs counter to the generally accepted idea that account-
ability encourages, rather than impedes, acceptable behavior, an idea
165. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.\V.2d 193, 198 (1963).
166. See Bell v. Schwartz, 422 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D. Minn. 1976); Paige ". Bing
Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.V.2d 46, 48 (1975), Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 79,
158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968).
167. Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.\V.2d 352, 353-54 (1972), over-
ruled sub silentio, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Lemmen
v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 80, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968).
168. As to the weight of this burden, it should be re-emphasized that the immu-
nity does not eliminate the burden caused by the tortious conduct; it merely shifts
that burden from the tortfeasor to the injured child. See supra notes 92-95 and
accompanying text. The more onerous the burden is for the parent, the heavier it is
for the child. Furthermore, when insurance exists, finding liability can actually
decrease the burden by providing a fund for child care. See Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank
v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 169, 262 N.E.2d 826, 829 (1970) (homeowner's
liability insurance unavailable to pay for child's injuries because of parental immu-
nity); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 So. 2d 104,
108 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (same); supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Thus,
even if it is true that the parents' new burden of paying damages would be heavy, this
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the burden should not be imposed on
the parents.
169. See Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971); Cole v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 633, 177 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1970).
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at the heart of the fault system of liability. 170 It is illogical, moreover,
to allege that being held accountable for failing to discharge an obli-
gation impedes the ability to fulfill that obligation.
The final reason advanced for retaining the immunity in specific
circumstances is a reluctance to "enable others, ignorant of a case's
peculiar familial distinctions and bereft of any standards, to second-
guess a parent's management of family affairs."''7 Although the
desire to shield parents from misguided "second-guessing" by juries is
a rational goal, this justification ignores the realities of the litigation
process. The finders of fact will not be ignorant of relevant familial
distinctions, because they will act only after a full trial on the merits
in which pertinent family data can be presented. Moreover, the jury
can be instructed as to the appropriate standards and is no more
"bereft" of standards in a case involving parental discretion than it
would be in any other negligence case. Even the fear that juries may
"disrupt the wide sphere of reasonable discretion which is necessary in
order for parents to properly exercise their responsibility"' 172 can be
assuaged by including in the charge an instruction that the law gives
parents great discretion in these matters. Absent any indication that
juries will ignore evidence or disregard instructions, the proponents of
the partial immunity have not met the "heavy burden" of justifying
"[a] rule which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing."1 73
C. Abrogation with Second Thoughts- The Problem of Duty
States that abrogate parental immunity are required to face the
question: What duties do parents owe their children? Although this
question has not received much attention in most states, the New York
Court of Appeals, which had abrogated parental immunity, 174 held in
Holodook v. Spencer 7 5 that parents have no legal duty to their chil-
dren to supervise them properly. 7 Indeed, the court determined
170. See W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 5, at 23.
171. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49
(1975); accord Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971). This reluctance
has not kept courts from permitting juries to find liability where the parent's tort was
intentional. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
172. Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
173. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35, 38 (1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting), overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434,
438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969).
174. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969).
175. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
176. Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872. But see Gabel v. Koba, 1
Wash. App. 684, 688, 463 P.2d 237, 240 (1969) (the primary legal responsibility for
the protection of children rests upon the parent).
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that it was against public policy to recognize parental failure to
supervise as either an actionable tort or as a basis for a claim for
contribution by an unrelated defendant who was partially responsible
for the infant's injuries.'77
The position of the New York Court of Appeals in Holodook is an
extreme one. Other courts, when presented with cases of negligent
supervision, have decided the issue within the context of the Goller
formulation as an issue involving immunity, rather than as a question
of duty.17 1  Those courts which held that parents could be liable
assumed that a duty to supervise exists.'7 9 That the Holodook court
accomplished its goals by refusing to recognize a duty to supervise,
rather than by extending parental immunity to negligently supervising
parents, has serious ramifications for both infants 80 and third par-
ties.'"' An immunity does not establish that a defendant's conduct is
not tortious; it simply absolves him of liability."'2 A holding that the
defendant owes no duty, however, means that the conduct is not
tortious. Because the Holodook court thus established a novel position
177. 36 N.Y.2d at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68. The New York
Court of Appeals later held that a parent could be liable for contribution if he had
unreasonably entrusted a dangerous instrument to his child, the child had injured
himself with that instrument, and a third party was held liable for those injuries.
Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 341, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340,
346 (1978). The duty breached in Nolechek was the parents' "duty to third parties to
shield them from an infant child's improvident use of a dangerous instrument." Id. at
338, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344. Even in the case of a dangerous
instrument, however, the parent would not be held liable to his injured child. Id. at
341, 385 N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
178. E.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972)
(parents exempt from suit when an eight-month-old infant chewed on a defective
electrical cord left within her reach, although the mother had seen the child playing
with the cord, because the use of the cord was a matter within the parents' right of
discretion regarding housing), overruled sub silentio, Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261, 201 N.W.2d
825, 832 (1972) (parent liable for contribution when child injured by a power lawn
mower); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246-47,
201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972) (parents liable for contribution when three-year-old
child ran into the street and was struck by a car); Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75,
80, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968) (parents immune when a six-year-old child was
struck by a car while attempting to cross the street because the duty to instruct the
child on how to cross streets is under the "other care" exception to the immunity's
abrogation).
179. See Macey v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Alaska 1978); Thore-
son v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246-47, 201 N.V.2d
745, 753 (1972).
180. An infant would not be able to sue his parent's estate, as he would in some
states where parental immunity blocked the child's suit. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
182. See Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 239, 330 A.2d 335, 340 (1974); W.
Prosser, supra note 5, § 131, at 970.
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in this confused area, and retreated from New York's prior position of
complete abrogation of parental immunity,1 3 it is important to ana-
lyze the reasons the court offered for its change of direction.
In Holodook, a four-and-one-half-year-old child was struck by a
car driven by a third party. The child sued the car driver, who sought
contribution from the parents.1s4 The court initially contended that
New York "has not ventured into the realm of duties owed by parents
to their children" 8 - and that children had never had a cause of action
against their parents for injuries caused by negligent supervision."180 It
was inaccurate, however, to say that the issue had not been consid-
ered. While until recently New York courts had not been specifically
presented with the issue in a suit by a child against his parents,187
earlier cases had imputed negligent parental supervision to the child
to bar the child's action against a third party. 88  Thus, these courts
183. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969).
184. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 42, 324 N.E.2d 338, 341, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (1974).
Holodook is a consolidation of three cases: Ryan v. Fahey, 43 A.D.2d 429, 352
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1974) (child run over by lawn mower); Holodook v. Spencer, 43
A.D.2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1974) (child struck by car); and Graney v. Granoy,
43 A.D.2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1973) (child fell from slide).
185. 36 N.Y.2d at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
186. Id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
187. It is not surprising that a suit directly involving negligent supervision had not
been litigated until recently. Until the decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), New York allowed contribu-
tion between tortfeasors only under limited conditions. Therefore, before 1972,
procedural rules prevented third parties who had injured negligently supervised
children from impleading the parents, and thus the issue was not presented to the
courts in this context. Additionally, between 1928, when New York adopted parental
immunity, Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928), and 1969,
when the immunity was abrogated, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), children were not able to bring suits for
negligent supervision against their parents. The absence of direct suits before 1928
can be explained by society's attitude regarding the parent-child relationship. See
supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
188. From 1839 to 1935 it was the law in New York that a child could not recover
from a negligent third party if the child's injury was caused in part by the parent's
negligent supervision. Mangam v. Brooklyn R.R., 38 N.Y. 455 (1868); Hartfield v.
Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839). The reason for this was that the parent's
negligence was imputed to the child, who was then barred by the doctrine of
contributory negligence. Thus, because negligence does not exist without duty, the
courts which imputed negligence to the child had found that a parent had a legally
cognizable duty to supervise his child. This duty could have been owed to one of two
people, the child or the third party whose negligence was partially responsible for the
child's injury. Both case law and a 1935 study prepared for the New York State Law
Revision Commission indicate that the duty ran to the child. Hartfield v. Roper, 21
Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839); G. Turner, Imputation of Parent's or Custodian's
Contributory Negligence to an Infant Plaintiff, in Leg. Doe. No. 60, at 47, 59 (1935)
(report of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n). The Holodook court rejected the idea that
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had found that the parent had a legally cognizable duty to supervise
his child, otherwise there would have been no parental negligence to
impute to the child. 189
Having reached the questionable conclusion that New York had
never recognized a duty to supervise, the court listed its policy reasons
for finding that no duty existed, relying on many of the same ration-
ales it had rejected in Gelbman v. Gelbinan 9 0 when parental immu-
nity was abrogated. Initially, the court alleged that an action by a
child for negligent supervision would place an unreasonable burden
on the parent by "circumscrib[ing] the wide range of discretion a
parent ought to have in permitting his child to undertake responsibil-
ity and gain independence."'' As discussed earlier, this reasoning
the duty ran to the child. On the other hand, if the duty is owed to the third party, he
should be able to recover contribution from the parent in the event of a lawsuit by
the child, because the third party would have been injured by the parent's breach of
a duty owed to him. Holodook did not discuss the possibility of a duty running to the
third party, but in Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978), the court expressly rejected the idea, except in those few cases
where the negligent supervision involved entrusting a child with a dangerous instru-
ment.
189. The rule of imputed negligence was abolished by N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 3-
111 (MeKinney 1978), which provides: "In an action brought by an infant to recover
damages for personal injury the contributory negligence of the infant's parent or
other custodian shall not be imputed to the infant." Id. The Holodook court stated
that, in some cases, recognition of a parental duty to supervise would contravene the
legislative intent of § 3-111. The court reasoned that allowing the parent to be held
liable for contribution would diminish the child's recovery if the family is viewed as
an economic unit, and that the legislative goal behind § 3-111, permitting the injured
child full recovery, would thus be undermined. This argument overlooks a number of
factors. First, suit is allowed in a great number of instances even though the family
treasury is thereby diminished. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, when the parent carries adequate insurance, the family funds will not be
depleted. Third, the Holodook court's logic seems somewhat inconsistent in that it
first argued that New York had never recognized a duty to supervise and then alleged
that the legislature intended to discard the actionable tort for negligent supervision
when it passed § 3-111. 36 N.Y.2d at 48, 324 N.E.2d at 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.
The court failed to recognize, however, that the legislature abolished the imputed
negligence rule to allow the child to recover damages previously denied from negli-
gent third persons, regardless of the parent's contributory negligence of failure to
supervise. Because parent-child immunity shielded parents from liability at the time
§ 3-111 was enacted, the legislature was not required to consider the effect that the
abolition of imputed negligence would have on parents' liability. Parental immunity
was assured. The legislature's action, therefore, should not be viewed as a tacit
rejection of the duty to supervise. Its goal was, more likely than not, merely to allow
the child recovery from the third party tortfeasor because it is against public policy to
allow an injury to go completely uncompensated. See Neff v. City of Cameron, 213
Mo. 350, 360, 111 S.W. 1139, 1141 (1908).
190. 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
191. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 871 (1974).
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cannot withstand scrutiny.9 2 The judicial system has proved to be
capable of distinguishing acceptable parental conduct from that
which should not be countenanced. The real need to recognize paren-
tal prerogatives does not require that the courts permit parents to act
negligently toward their children with impunity.
The Holodook court also voiced concern that suits for negligent
supervision would endanger family harmony and could, moreover, be
used "in a retaliatory context between estranged parents . . . or by
children estranged from their parents."9 3 The court did not establish
why it is more likely that this one type of action will lead to dishar-
mony or be used in a retaliatory context than a suit based on other
types of parental conduct. Vengeful children, and parents seeking
retaliation against their former spouses, could get just as much satis-
faction from a judgment in a suit charging "regular" negligence as
from a similar-sized judgment in a suit based on negligent parental
supervision. Furthermore, even though the incentive for initiating suit
might be vengeful, the parent would not be held liable unless negli-
gence were proven. The innocent parent would therefore have little to
fear, and the negligent parent should not be heard to complain for
being called to account for his actionable negligence.
The area of negligent supervision, however, often involves an addi-
tional factor not generally present in the other cases of parental negli-
gence-the presence of a third party. The typical fact pattern involves
a child who was negligently supervised by his parents and was conse-
quently injured by a third person. Whereas a child will generally not
sue an uninsured parent, 94 an unrelated defendant has no natural
constraints regarding suit and will attempt to recoup part of the
damages he must pay through contribution from the parents.
The Holodook court found this possibility to be decisive of the need
for immunity for several reasons that merit serious consideration. The
court expressed concern that a parent's liability for contribution based
on a claim of negligent supervision might result in detriment to the
child. First, the parent may refuse to prosecute the child's cause of
action against the third party for fear that the parent will be im-
pleaded and required to pay damages.1 95 Second, the amount of the
child's recovery from the third party tortfeasor might indirectly be
192. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
193. 36 N.Y.2d at 49, 324 N.E.2d at 345, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
194. Id. at 52, 324 N.E.2d at 347, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Jasen, J., dissenting);
accord Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 127, 140, 355 N.Y.S.2d
432, 446 (1974) (Hopkins, J., dissenting); cf. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350,
361, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975) ("[w]hen an action is brought against a parent,
frequently it will be brought at the instance of, or with the approval of, the parent
with an eye toward recovery from the parent's already purchased liability insurance"
(citations omitted)).
195. 36 N.Y.2d at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
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reduced because the parent might divert part of the funds received to
satisfy his obligation to pay damages.'
These concerns are somewhat unrealistic. A parent's failure to sue a
third party does not result in the extinction of the child's claim. The
statute of limitations is tolled until the child reaches majority, at
which time he can maintain a suit in his own right. 97 Furthermore,
the court can protect the child's damage award from diversion by the
parents by placing the award in a trust and appointing a non-parent
trustee.' 98 The possibility that the parent might appropriate some
part of the child's damage award to pay the third-party judgment for
contribution would thus be eliminated.
The major problem with the Holodook approach, however, is that
the court ignored the strong policy reasons behind contribution-
reasons espoused not only by the courts, 1 9 but also by the legislatures
that have enacted contribution statutes.20 0  Fairness requires that
"among parties involved together in causing damage by negligence,
[apportionment of liability] should rest on relative responsibility." 20'
Under Holodook, an unreasonable burden is placed on the third part)'
who cannot recover a judgment against the parents for contribu-
tion.20 2  This financial burden is especially unfair when the third
party has been only slightly negligent and yet is required to pay for all
of the child's injuries because the parent's conduct, although more
egregious, involved no breach of duty. -2 0 3 In some states where the
196. Id. at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
197. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 208 (McKinnev 1972).
198. See Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d 523, 531, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787, 794-95
(Sup. Ct. 1973) ("[s]eparate guardianship and trust accounts under judicial scrutiny
are the legal protection for infants so that damages awarded for their pain and
suffering are not invaded to pay the parents' debt"); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1206
(McKinney 1976) (court may order that an infant's money be placed in a trust or in a
bank subject to withdrawal only by court order); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1701
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (court has power over infant's property and can ap-
point a guardian whether or not the parents are alive).
199. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247
Iowa 800, 802, 77 N.W.2d 23, 27 (1956); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 295, 192
A.2d 24, 25 (1963); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 14849, 282 N.E.2d
288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387-88 (1972).
200. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1002 (1962); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663-12 (1976);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-3S
(1976).
201. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972).
202. When an injury is caused by two tortfeasors, "[t]here is obvious lack of sense
and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss... to be shouldered
onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the
existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the
other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free." \V. Prosser, supra note 5, § 50, at
307.
203. See, e.g., Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (child kicked by pony
tethered on third party's fenced land); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Freschi, 393
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parent is protected from liability to his child by an immunity, a third
party sued by the child has been permitted to obtain contribution
from the negligent parent.20 4
Additionally, the requirement that the third party defendant pay
all the damages following an accident relieves the parent of an obliga-
tion he would have had if not for his parental status. Moreover, if as
the Holodook court suggests, the family is viewed as an economic
unit,20 5 the requirement that the third party pay the total damages
means that the compensatory funds directly enrich the family treasury
of the wrongdoing parent, a result which violates the prohibition
against a tortfeasor benefiting from his wrong.206 The ultimate injus-
tice occurs when a negligently supervised child is killed by a third
party. In that case, a wrongful death recovery would go directly to
the parents whose carelessness contributed to the child's death.
The Holodook court's use of a duty analysis creates additional
injustices for third parties. Not only is it possible that the unrelated
tortfeasor may be required to sustain the entire cost of injuries to
negligently supervised children, third parties may also have to bear
the cost of their own injuries sustained as a result of the negligently
supervised child's actions. For example, a third party who was injured
while swerving to avoid a toddler playing in the street could not
recover in New York because the parent breached no duty by failing
to supervise the infant. 207 In those states where parents are immune
S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (no parental liability when three-year-old child
injured after releasing truck brakes, even though parents did not restrain child from
repeated attempts to drive trucks).
204. E.g., Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1978); Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 221, 110
A.2d 175, 177 (1955); Zarrella v. Miller, 100 R.I. 545, 548-49, 217 A.2d 673, 675-76
(1966).
205. 36 N.Y.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69 (the family "is a
single economic unit and recovery by a third party against the parent ultimately
diminishes the value of the child's recovery").
206. Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 3 (1937); D. Dobbs, Handbook on
the Law of Remedies § 5.15, at 414 (1973).
207. See Nolechek v. Cesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 340, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1273, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340, 345 (1978). The Nolechek court recognized the injustice of placing sole
liability on a third party when the parent was really at fault. In Nolechek, a parent
gave a motorcycle to his partially blind child. The unsupervised child was decapi-
tated when he rode into a steel cable that had been placed over a private road. The
court refused to recognize a parental duty owed to the child, but did recognize a
duty, on the part of the parent who entrusts a child with a dangerous instrumental-
ity, to third parties to protect them from injury. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 346; cf. Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp., 51 A.D.2d 542, 378
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1976) (no duty to child when child injured by explosives in father's
basement, but contribution allowed because of duty to the world at large not to
negligently maintain explosives).
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from claims of negligent supervision, third parties injured in such an
accident could recover. 20 8
The third party, moreover, is required to shoulder this burden
solely for the benefit of an unrelated individual. When the child is
prevented from recovery, it is at least done for the espoused purpose of
preserving family harmony and the child's ultimate good.20 9  The
negligent third party, on the other hand, stands to gain nothing by the
decision not to hold the parents partially liable. He and the totally
innocent members of his family stand only to lose. The Holodook
court feared that the family treasury of the injured child might be
depleted by a finding of parental liability for contribution,210 but did
not recognize that the injured child's family is essentially being fa-
vored at the expense of the third party's family.2- 1
The solicitude shown the injured child's family is premised on the
assertion that "third parties . . . are more likely than the parent in
these cases to have appropriate liability coverage."212 Only when the
child is injured by the individual third party's use of an automobile,
however, is the non-parent more likely to carry insurance.2 1 3 Negli-
gent supervision cases do not always involve automobile accidents.2 1 4
There is no reason to believe, in these many other cases, that the third
party is more probably insured than is the parent.
208. See Chester v. Evans, 115 Ga. App. 46, 153 S.E.2d 583 (1967); Moore v.
Lexington Transit Corp., 418 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1967); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me.
292, 298-300, 192 A.2d 24, 26-27 (1963).
209. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
210. 36 N.Y.2d at 47, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69.
211. If the family is viewed as an economic unit and an innocent member of the
third party's family has been injured, the Holodook approach will diminish his
recovery, the very result which the Holodook court sought to avoid. For example, the
C's and D's each have a taro-year-old child. Mrs. D and her child visit the home of
Mrs. C. Mrs. D negligently supervises the two children who are injured because of
Mrs. C's negligently maintained swimming pool. Both parents have been negligent,
but Mrs. C could not get contribution from Mrs. D if D's child won an award of
damages from the C family. Mrs. D, however, could get contribution from Mrs. C
for any damages assessed against Mrs. D in a suit by C's child. The end result is that
the recovery of C's child has been diminished.
212. 36 N.Y.2d at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
213. This is because of compulsory automobile insurance. See statutes cited supra
note 142.
214. E.g., Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969)
(negligently maintained beach); McCallister v. Sun Valley Pools, Inc., 100 Mich.
App. 131, 298 N.W.2d 687 (1980) (improperly built swimming pool); Smith v.
Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82, 417 N.E.2d 530, 436 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1981) (dog bite);
Hotaling v. Smith, 63 A.D.2d 219, 406 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1978) (negligently designed or
maintained camp ground); Morales v. Moss, 44 A.D.2d 687, 355 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1974)
(landlord's negligence and product liability); Kaplan v. Vavasseur, 101 Misc. 2d 519,
421 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (dog bite); Lampman v. Cairo Central School
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The Holodook court concluded that a parent's duty to supervise his
child is " 'one whose enforcement can depend only on love.' "215 No
explanation was offered as to why a parental duty of supervision
cannot be legally enforced by a system that requires proper supervi-
sion by schools, 210 grandparents,2 17 baby sitters21 8 and Boy Scout
leaders.2 19 Negligent supervision " 'if done by one ordinary person to
another' "220 is tortious; it is equally wrongful when engaged in by a
parent.22 1
The duty analysis adopted by the Holodook court to prohibit liabil-
ity is even harder to justify than is the parent-child immunity. The
immunity sacrifices the child in the name of protecting the family.
The duty analysis will often have the same effect, but where a third
party is involved, this approach also sacrifices the third party for the
benefit of the plaintiff's family.
That decisions in the area of negligent supervision will be difficult
to make is certain. The jury is called upon to make fine distinctions
between parental activity that is negligent and that which actually
furthers the parent's obligation to allow his child to exercise indepen-
dence and responsibility. Juries, however, are often required to make
equally difficult decisions, and that decisions are difficult is no reason
to refuse to make them, especially in light of society's "vital interest
... in protecting people from losses resulting from accidents." 222
District, 81 Misc. 2d 395, 366 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (playground slide).
215. 36 N.Y.2d at 50, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (quoting Holodook
v. Spencer, 43 A.D.2d 129, 135, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1973)).
216. McGovern v. Riverdale Country Sch. Realty Co., 51 A.D.2d 894, 380
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1976); Oakley v. State, 38 A.D.2d 998, 329 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1972), ajf'd
mem., 32 N.Y.2d 773, 298 N.E.2d 120, 344 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1973).
217. Barrera v. General Elec. Co., 84 Misc. 2d 901, 378 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.
1975).
218. Standifer v. Pate, 291 Ala. 434, 282 So. 2d 261 (1973). But see Smith v.
Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82, 417 N.E.2d 530, 436 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1981) (siblings have no
duty to supervise).
219. Kearney v. Roman Cath. Church, 31 A.D.2d 541, 542, 295 N.Y.S.2d 186,
187 (1968).
220. 36 N.Y.2d at 44, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 865-66 (quoting
McCurdy I, supra note 2, at 1030). The Holodook court had asserted that its purpose
was to confine the effect of the abrogation of parent-child immunity to cases involv-
ing "acts which if done by one ordinary person to another would be torts." 36 N.Y.2d
at 44, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 865. Because negligent supervision by a
non-parent is an actionable tort, parent-child immunity should not shield negligently
supervising parents.
221. Gabel v. Koba, 1 Wash. App. 684, 688, 463 P.2d 237, 240 (1969) (parents
have a duty to care for their children); cf. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 51,
324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (1974) ("a parent's duty to protect his
child from injury [is] a duty which not only arises from the family relation but goes to
its very heart").
222. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969).
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III. STANDARDS SUGGESTED TO BErrEa ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF
BOTH CHILDREN AND THEM PARENTS
Over the last fifteen years, courts in nine states have determined
that parent-child immunity is not defensible and have either abolished
it completely or have refused to adopt it.22 3 These courts have recog-
nized that an immunity is the exception to the general rule of liability
for negligently caused injury.2 24 As an exception, it must be justified,
and the person who contends that he should escape liability where
others must pay has the burden of showing the merit of his claim for
special treatment.2 2 .5 Parents have never produced such proof, and
the decisions that have protected parents from liability have been
based on little more than judicial suspicion that permitting suits be-
tveen parent and child for injuries would have unacceptable conse-
quences. Whatever little basis there may have been for such surmise
has been undercut by experience in those states that do not accept the
immunity.
There is no evidence that abrogation of parental immunity has
created an unreasonable burden for either families or courts. Parents
have not been enfeebled, nor has their constitutional right to raise
their children been curtailed. This right, which was recognized most
clearly in Wisconsin v. Yoder,22 is subject to limitation in that it can
only be exercised reasonably.22 7 The constitutional right is thus more
confined in its implementation than is the parent-child immunity,
even in its partial form, because the immunity gives a parent unlim-
ited protection from liability, regardless of the enormity of his con-
duct.
Parental immunity should be abolished and the courts should recog-
nize that parents do have duties toward their children, including the
duty to act as "an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent [would
223. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en
banc); Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969); Anderson
v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d
1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nuelle v. WVells,
154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971);
Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); cf. Hachulla v. United States,
No. Civ. 80-535 (D. Or. May 11, 1981) (admiralty case).
224. See President & Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J.).
225. See Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 487, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009
(1974).
226. 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972).
227. See id. at 229-30; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-68 (1934); supra
note 115 and accompanying text.
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act] in similar circumstances. 2 28  This standard would permit an
injured child, or a third-party plaintiff, to recover only if the parent
had failed to meet the standard of care required of parents. Thus, the
standard recognizes that parents require discretion regarding their
conduct toward their children. Courts should further emphasize pa-
rental child-rearing rights by including in their jury instructions an
admonition to recognize the wide discretion that parents must be
accorded in determining how best to raise their children. A reasonable
parent standard, if adequately explained to the jury, would thus
protect legitimate parental prerogatives without depriving the injured
child of the possibility of recovery, where recovery would be appro-
priate. 2 19
Courts or legislatures that hesitate to abrogate parental immunity
completely might consider adopting a standard that would permit the
court to grant immunity when the parent has proven that the chal-
lenged conduct was both peculiarly parental and reasonable. The use
of the term "peculiarly parental," rather than the Goller approach of
enumerating types of conduct,230 would avoid requiring the courts to
apply "vaguely worded, highly subjective standards"2 31 to determine
whether an array of fact patterns fall within specific categories of
immunized conduct.2 32  Additionally, the requirement that the con-
228. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
293 (1971) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). There is some doubt whether California, in
abrogating the immunity, gave parents some protection not provided other defend-
ants. The issue is whether a "reasonable parent" standard differs from the usual
negligence standard-that of a reasonable person under like circumstances. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965). If the defendant's status as a parent is consid-
ered to be one of the "circumstances," there is no difference between the two
standards. If the defendant's position as a parent is not one of the "circumstances,"
the standards differ slightly, in that a jury might find that a reasonable parent would
behave in a different way than a nonparent under the same conditions. In practice,
there is probably little difference between a "reasonable parent" standard and a
"reasonable person" standard. To the extent that there is a difference, and by
analogy to the cases involving defendants engaged in a trade or profession, the parent
should be given the benefit, or the burden, of the parental standard. G. Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968) (reason-
able standard of professional care for architects includes duty of supervision).
229. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G (1979). The American Law Insti-
tute recommends that the immunity be completely abrogated but states that: "Repu-
diation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission
that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tor-
tious." Id. § 895G(2), at 426. This language establishes a reasonableness standard in
that "otherwise privileged" conduct includes parental discipline, which is subject to a
reasonableness requirement, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, and conduct
that is "not tortious" is conduct that is reasonable or that violates no specific duty.
230. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
231. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980).
232. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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duct be reasonable would prevent a parent who has engaged in totally
unacceptable conduct from escaping liability. 233
Under this approach, the decision as to whether the parent had
acted reasonably in carrying out a peculiarly parental function would
be a question of law, and the court's determination would be disposi-
rive on the issue of the parent's immunity. In accordance with the
general rule, the burden of proof would rest with the person asserting
the immunity234 - the parent. If the court was not convinced by the
parent's proof, the case would go to the jury, which would decide
whether the plaintiff had proven that the parent's conduct was unrea-
sonable. Thus, the court's initial determination on the immunity issue
would protect against the possibility of jury bias against unconven-
tional child-rearing practices,235 without imposing any additional re-
quirement on the plaintiff.
There are drawbacks, however, to this approach. Not only would it
be somewhat cumbersome for the court to decide the immunity issue
as a preliminary matter, but there is no evidence that even this limited
immunity will further any strong public policy. Strongly held beliefs,
however, prevent many courts from abolishing the immunity com-
pletely. This narrowly confined immunity may, therefore, provide a
way to accommodate those beliefs without significantly interfering
with the plaintiff's right to be compensated if he can prove his case.
Accomplishing this result would be well worth the additional burden
such a procedure would impose.
CONCLUSION
Ninety years ago, the parent-child relationship was such that a
parent's authority was absolute and a child's position vulnerable. In
this atmosphere, the doctrine of parent-child immunity developed.
Times have changed, and courts and legislatures should reconsider the
wisdom of a rule of law that denies an injured infant the right to sue
the individual whose negligence caused the injury. Parents receive
adequate protection when their conduct is measured against that of
the reasonable parent in similar circumstances. Adoption of this
standard will thus protect the parent while preventing "a child in-
jured by his father's negligent act, perhaps maimed for life, [from
having] no redress for the damages he has suffered." 10
233. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921-22, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (en bane).
234. See Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1973); Morgan v.
Willingham, 424 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1970); Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F.
Supp. 925, 930 (W.D.S.C. 1956); Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super.
442, 448, 386 A.2d 442, 446 (App. Div. 1978); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40
(Utah 1980).
235. See supra notes 110, 171 and accompanying text.
236. Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Marchand, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 157, 166.
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APPENDIX
A SURVEY OF PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY IN
THE UNITED STATES
Alabama:
Alaska:
Arizona:
Arkansas:
California:
Colorado:
Connecticut:
Delaware:
District of Columbia:
Florida:
Georgia:
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Owens v. Auto Mut.
Indem., 235 Ala. 9, 11, 177 So. 133, 134-36 (1937); see
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 290 Ala. 21, 24, 273 So. 2d 186, 188 (1973).
Parent not immune where unemancipated child's injuries
were caused by parent's negligent driving. Language indi-
cates that the court may favor an approach similar to that
used in Wisconsin. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska
1967).
Immunity abrogated except where the act involved a breach
of a duty owed to the child within the family sphere. San-
doval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 12-14, 623 P.2d 800, 801-
03 (1981).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Thomas v. Inmon,
268 Ark. 221, 223, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980).
Immunity abrogated. Parents' conduct to be judged by
what "an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent [would]
have done in similar circumstances." Gibson v. Gibson, 3
Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293
(1971) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Horton v. Reaves,
186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974) (en bane).
Parent immune except for injuries caused by negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle. Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn.
48, 50-54, 316 A.2d 783, 785, (1972); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 52-572c (West 1967).
No immunity where injury was caused by an automobile
accident, to the extent that there is liability insurance. Wil-
liams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 670-72 (Del. 1976). Parent
immune in actions by unemancipated child based on negli-
gent supervision. Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del.
1979).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Dennis v. Walker,
284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C. 1968).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Orefice v. Albert,
237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970). One intermediate appellate
court has held recently that the immunity does not exist
where the injuries were caused by a parent's negligent driv-
ing. Ard v. Ard, 395 So. 2d 586, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981). The Ard case, which also states that the immunity
may be abrogated in other instances, is presently on appeal
to the Florida Supreme Court.
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Coleman v. Cole-
man, 157 Ga. App. 533, 533-34, 278 S.E.2d 114, 114-15
(1981).
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Hawaii:
Idaho:
Illinois:
Indiana:
Iowa:
Kansas:
Kentucky:
Louisiana:
Maine:
Maryland:
Massachusetts:
No parent-child immunity. Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51
Hawaii 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1970).
Immunity exists for injuries caused by parents' failure to
supervise; no position on injuries caused in other ways.
Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 204-06, 610 P.2d 560, 564
(1980).
Although the most recent supreme court cases state that
parents are immune unless their conduct was willful or
wanton, Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 Ill. 2d 165,
171, 395 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (1979); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7
Ill. 2d 608, 618-19, 131 N.E.2d 525, 530-31 (1956), the
lower appellate courts have held that the immunity has
been abrogated except where injuries were caused by "'mere
negligence within the scope of the parental relationship."
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Il. App. 3d
234, 236, 403 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (1980); see Cummings v.
Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 70, 372 N.E.2d 1127, 1128
(1978); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 202, 241
N.E.2d 12, 13-14 (1968).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Vaughan v.
Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 499-500, 316 N.E.2d 455,
456-57 (1974).
Immunity abrogated at least where tortious conduct is "out-
side the area of parental authority and discretion." Question
of whether it is totally abrogated has been left open. Turner
v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1981).
Immunity abrogated for injuries sustained in motor vehicle
accidents. Language indicates that the court may favor an
approach similar to that used in Visconsin. Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 763-65, 611 P.2d 135, 138-41
(1980).
Immunity only if negligence involved the reasonable exer-
cise of parental authority or ordinary parental discretion
with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of the
child. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.V.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970).
Immunity between unemancipated child and parents who
are married or parent who has custody. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:571 (West 1965), construed in Bondurant v. Bondurant,
386 So. 2d 705, 706-07 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
Immunity abrogated in automobile case with statement
that the abrogation was not limited to automobile acci-
dents, but that the court would consider the immunity in
future cases. Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639-40 (Me.
1979).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Shell Oil Co. v.
Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 3, 403 A.2d 379, 380-81 (1979).
Immunity abrogated for negligence cases arising from auto-
mobile accidents, to the extent of insurance coverage.
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 351-54, 339 N.E.2d
907, 911-16 (1975). A later case suggests that the presence of
insurance may not be necessary. Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 623-24, 351 N.E.2d 526, 529-30 (1976). The court also
indicated that the immunity might be abrogated in other
instances. Id. at 629-30, 351 N.E.2d at 532-33.
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Michigan:
Minnesota:
Mississippi:
Missouri:
Montana:
Nebraska:
Nevada:
New Hampshire:
New Jersey:
New Mexico:
New York:
Immunity only if negligence involved the reasonable exer-
cise of parental authority or the exercise of reasonable pa-
rental discretion with respect to the provision of food, cloth-
ing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.
Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73
(1972). Parent is immune for injuries caused by negligent
supervision. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480,
484-85, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48-49 (1975).
No immunity. Jury to use reasonable parent standard in
judging parent's conduct. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d
595, 599-601 (Minn. 1980).
Parent immune from liability for injuries caused to un-
emancipated child by parent's negligence. Rayburn v.
Moore, 241 So. 2d 675, 676 (Miss. 1970); Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
Parent with custody of the child is immune from liability
unless the suit will not seriously disturb family relations.
Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Mo. 1979) (en
bane).
In Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 37-38, 269 P.2d 302, 304-05
(1954), it was decided that Montana law would not permit
a child to sue his parents for personal injuries. This conclu-
sion is supported by a case involving the husband-wife Im-
munity in which the Montana court stated that intra-family
immunity was valid. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leary,
544 P.2d 444, 446-48 (Mont. 1975).
Parent immune from liability for injuries caused to un-
emancipated child by parent's negligence. Child can sue
parents for brutal, cruel or inhuman treatment. Pullen v.
Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 220, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (1959).
No parent-child immunity. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,
404-05, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (1974).
No parent-child immunity. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432,
434-35, 224 A.2d 588, 590-591 (1966).
Immunity abrogated where neither the exercise of parental
authority nor the adequacy of child care is in issue. Small v.
Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 244, 330 A.2d 335, 343 (1974);
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267
A.2d 490, 494 (1970). The lower courts disagree as to the
extent of the abrogation. Compare Convery v. Maczka, 163
N.J. Super. 411, 415-17, 394 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Super.
Ct. 1978) (no immunity for failure to properly supervise),
with Fritz v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 73-74, 371 A.2d
833, 835 (Super. Ct. 1977) (parent immune if injuries com-
plained of were caused by failure to supervise properly).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Fitzgerald v. Valdez,
77 N.M. 769, 776, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967).
Parent-child immunity abrogated. Gelbman v. Gelbman,
23 N.Y.2d 434, 437-39, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-32 (1969). Parents, however, have no
legal duty to supervise their children and consequently are
not liable for injuries caused by their failure to do so. Holo-
dook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346,
364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-72 (1974).
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North Carolina:
North Dakota:
Ohio:
Oklahoma:
Oregon:
Pennsylvania:
Rhode Island:
South Carolina:
South Dakota:
Tennessee:
Texas:
Utah:
Vermont:
Virginia:
Immunity recognized except for injuries arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the
parent. Triplett v. Triplett, 34 N.C. App. 212, 214-15, 237
S.E.2d 546, 547 (1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.21 (1975);
see Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C. App. 224, 224-26, 249 S.E.2d
862, 863-64 (1978). This abrogation has been broadly con-
strued to include injuries sustained while crossing a street
after leaving the parent's car. Snow v. Nixon, No. 8017 SC
44 (N.C. Ct. App. May 19, 1981).
No parent-child immunity for negligence. Nuelle v. Vells,
154 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D. 1967).
Parent immune except where the injury is intentional or it is
shown that the parental relationship has been abandoned,
or where the injury is inflicted by the parent when acting in
his business capacity. Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St.
2d 117, 118-19, 216 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1966).
Parent immune from liability to unemanicipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. Tucker v. Tucker,
395 P.2d 67, 70 (Okla. 1964).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by the parent's ordinary or gross negligence,
but not for injuries caused by the parent's willful or mali-
cious tort. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 380-88, 397
P.2d 771, 774-77 (1964); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282,
301-02, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950) (en banc).
No parent-child immunity. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372,
375-76, 282 A.2d 351, 353 (1971).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court left open the question of whether the immu-
nity would protect a parent who had intentionally injured
his child. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 132-34, 131 A.
198, 199-200 (1925).
No parent-child immunity. Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132,
137, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (1980).
Courts have not considered the issue.
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by the parent's negligence. Mathis v. Am-
mons, 453 F. Supp. 1033, 1034-35 (E.D. Tenn. 1978);
Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 14647, 432
S.W.2d 894, 900 (1968).
Immunity retained for injuries caused by ordinary negli-
gence involving a reasonable exercise of parental authority
or the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to provisions for the care and necessities of the child.
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
No immunity, at least for intentional torts. Elkington v.
Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980).
Refused to recognize that an immunity existed that would
bar the suit, but indicated that limitations might be placed
upon parent-child actions. Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119,
121-22, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977).
Immunity abrogated to permit child to recover for injuries
suffered in a motor vehicle accident. Smith v. Kauffman,
212 Va. 181, 182-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 192-94 (1971). The
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Washington:
West Virginia:
Wisconsin:
Wyoming:
Virginia Supreme Court has upheld the immunity where
the child was injured due to the father's negligence that was
"incident to the parental relationship." Wright v. Wright,
213 Va. 177, 179, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1972).
The immunity was abrogated where the child's injury was
sustained in an automobile accident caused by the parent's
negligence. The supreme court stated that other issues con-
cerning parent-child immunity were to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411,
416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (en banc).
Immunity abrogated for injuries suffered by the child as a
result of the parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 723-25 (W. Va. 1976).
Immunity abrogated except where negligence involved an
exercise of parental authority or ordinary parental discre-
tion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services, and other care. Coller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
Parent liable for negligent supervision. Cole v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 634-35, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868-
69 (1970).
Parent immune from liability to unemancipated child for
injuries caused by parent's negligence, although the immu-
nity does not protect a parent who has injured his child
willfully or wantonly. Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99, 101
(Wyo. 1971); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 39-57, 269 P.2d 302,
305-14 (1954).
